War In Ukraine
Book Notes #41
War In Ukraine is a regime policy composition that includes essays by many authors. I don’t expect to learn anything new about in the war in Ukraine in this book, but rather, refresh us on what the regime’s current (2024) perspective is on the war and its possible outcomes.
Hal Brands, the editor of the entire book, writes his own introduction. He acknowledges the common perspective that the war did not start in 2022 but rather in 2014. He also includes it in the series of wars of Soviet succession, rather than a unique occurrence. As early as page three, Mr. Brands gives us the typical nausea-inducing polemics on the conflict, bordering on pornographic.
“Indeed, what sets the phase of the war since February 2022 apart is that it so hauntingly resembles something from these earlier, darker eras. Putin's invasion was not some limited land grab, some modest uptick in a long-running territorial dispute. It was an effort to topple Ukraine's government, kill or capture its leaders, and end its national existence. It was meant to shatter a whole set of norms and conventions underpinning the liberal international order-not least, the norm against the forcible conquest and annexation of territory-and thereby usher in an era in which neo-imperial powers engage in the most naked forms of predation.
The tactics Russian forces used in occupied areas-rape, murder, and torture; the kidnapping of Ukraine's children and the Russification of its schools- suggested a similarly totalizing ethos. So Russia's campaign, and Ukraine's desper- ate resistance, touched off a shockingly brutal conflict that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, consumed vast quantities of munitions and materiel, and produced geopolitical spillover around the world. If this war has proven so globally transfixing, perhaps that's because it reminds us of ugly realities-the viciousness of autocratic aggression, the destructiveness of large-scale war, the fra- gility of international order-we might prefer to forget.”
Mr. Brands also does the typical western liberal elite move of accusing Mr. Putin of what they are doing, which is ensuring that Ukraine is a “dysfunctional” client state, and that it was Mr. Putin’s “interference” in Ukrainian politics that caused the subsequent color revolutions.
We’ll skip over the rest of the his shilling for the “liberal order” and concentrate on the themes he highlights for the essays in the book. The first, which I have already stated, is that the Ukraine war did not start in 2022 but in 2014. The second is that the war is the result of a “double failure,” on Mr. Putin’s part of “ensure a weal. pliant Ukraine” and “the West’s failure to deter” an all-out attack. Third, that the course of the war is “highly contingent and predictable all at once.” Fourth, “the Ukraine War produced a world more fractured than at any time in decades.” Fifth, the war in Ukraine marked “the return of great-power nuclear crises.” The sixth and final theme is that the “global legacy” of the war is “yet to be fully written.” Well, duh. This theme seems rather pointless, and the fifth entirely made-up, as the “nuclear crises” are quite clearly played up by the media, and don’t actually exist. Mr. Brands then also gives us his fever dream about the autocratic future of eastern Europe if Ukraine had quickly fallen to Russia, but we’ll skip that too and get to the essays.
The first essay is in Part 1 / Origins and Overviews titled Ukraine, Russia, China, and the World, by Stephen Kotkin. I suspect this essay will be the most interesting one. Kotkin, in keeping with the pattern so far, highlights four great victories.
“Let us begin with a marvel: four great victories in 2022. First, Ukraine success- fully defended its sovereignty and independence, preventing Russian forces from seizing its capital or overturning its elected government. Second, the members of the Western alliance achieved a higher degree of unity and resolve, and a strong sense of renewed purpose, responding vigorously to Moscow's aggression. Third, Russia's vaunted, large, and modernized military, and especially its president, Vladimir Putin, were humiliated-not defeated strategically but exposed for sear- ing incompetence, corruption, and rot. Fourth, the Chinese leadership discredited itself”
Kotkin writes that the four great victories should be consolidated, such as through Transatlanticism (re: American dominance over Europe), but these are still up for grabs and have to be taken “off the table” so that they cannot be undone.
P. 19:
“Every day the war continues is a bad day for Ukraine and, for the most part, a good one for Putin.”
Kotkin writes that wars of attrition are governed by the capacity to fight and will to fight. Ukraine’s capacity is at risk and Russia’s is not; Russia’s will is strong and there is no threat on the horizon, while Ukraine’s is also strong (currently) but clearly at risk.
Ukraine’s will also relies on Western will, for which Kotkin provides us the nonsensical managerial equation: Ukrainian valor/ingenuity + Russian atrocities = Western unity and resolve.
The failure at Bakhmut and the 2023 attack toward Tokmak both damaged the first part of the equation.
Kotkin says that Ukraine needs a plan to win the war and win the peace. Ukraine will have to face the challenge of a legislatively ratified treaty and EU accession rather than continue fighting Ukraine needs a peace that neither recognized Russian annexation of any of its territory or compromises its right to join the EU or NATO. Ukraine cannot achieve this on the battlefield, so Kotkin recommends that “[i]t is long past time to open a more decisive political front.”
This means that “overt and covert means” should be used to cultivate, encourage, and promote “political alternatives” (to Mr. Putin’s regime).
P. 27:
“Incurring escalation risks on the battlefield, where Russia is stronger, has been accompanied by a refusal to incur escalation risks in the political arena. Russia’s political system is potentially vulnerable, and yet discussions of regime change, let alone bold measures to that effect, have been ruled out as excessively escalatory.”
Theorizing on what could be done in the political arena, Kotkin notes Russian defectors recruited by the CIA and MI6.
“Consider the possibility of constituting some form of a Russian government in exile or a committee of concerned patriots, located in and perhaps rotating through European capitals. I do not mean inviting the pro-Western democratic opposition- which has many courageous activists, but which is also highly fractious and, with exceptions, ineffective in rallying support inside the country-to form a government abroad. Arguably, if they were capable of doing this, they would have done so. (We'll have to see what they do next.) Instead, I mean Russian military and security officials, men in uniform, their medals prominently displayed on their chests: defectors from Putin who are unapologetic Russian nationalists, authoritar- ian, anti-Western, and evincing little or no affection for Ukraine, but who have concluded, correctly, that the war is badly damaging Russia.”
Honestly, disappointing from Mr. Kotkin, as it reads like a Hollywood fan-fiction spy thriller about the war. He seems to believe, like other westerners, that “humiliating” Mr. Putin in the eyes of the west is the same as humiliating him domestically. People residing in western media-controlled states understandably have this view, but the fact is, the New York Times and other rags like the Telegraph can write as many articles and books like this one about how Mr. Putin has been “humiliated,” but it accomplishes nothing.
Mr. Kotkin also expresses disappointment that the secret services did not involve themselves in Mr. Prigozhin’s apparent coup attempt.
“Top-level defectors should not call for Russia's defeat-the vast majority of Russians do not want to see their country defeated-but an end to the fighting. They would not have to praise or make concessions to the West beyond agreeing to an armi- stice without annexations or sovereign infringement on Ukraine, for Russia's sake. Men in uniform, the ones who are willing to defect, or have already defected but stayed in place, would appeal to their counterparts still in Russia who are fed up with the depth of the Putin regime's self-harm to Russian interests, a kind of Prigozhin episode redux. But this time, they would be greeted with policy levers to help arrest Russia's downward spiral. That would enhance their appeal to the mass of patriotic, nationalist Russians who could be drawn to an alternative to the current personal regime or at least the current course of the regime.
Uniformed defectors need to be given a platform and protection abroad, help to make speech after speech overflowing with insider information about how the war is damaging Russia, and assistance with communications technology to dif- fuse those messages throughout Russia's public sphere without consequences for those receiving them. This approach would need to be accompanied by a prom- ised package of sanctions relief and investment for Russia in the event of a lasting armistice without conditions. Many European business and government leaders would be relieved to be able to resume partnerships with a Russian government that ends the aggression against Ukraine to rescue Russia. Such a turn of events could possibly dampen the appeal of far-right pro-Russian movements in Europe as well.”
Let me be clear: the Western policy goal in support of Ukraine does not need regime change to succeed. It needs to raise the credible threat of regime change, to put pressure on the regime, to expand the public perception and concrete manifestations of political alternatives, to build on what Prigozhin demonstrated, Navalny achieved, and Nadezhdin reconfirmed. To enable Ukraine to obtain an armistice on favorable terms, Putin needs to feel that his regime is at serious risk. Such a proposal will be treated skeptically, and that is understandable. It suf- fers from uncertain prospects for success. But what is the better plan?”
Really, this just demonstrates the West’s impotence. If “the West” could come up with a path to end the war, Ukraine would probably take, it, but the bet they can come up with is some hair-brained scheme about building a government in exile with traitors boldly displaying war medals, as if Russians are morons who can be convinced by the appearance of shiny objects. To create a western puppet government and threaten the existence of the Russian state with it is the antithesis of what appeals to Russians. Kotkin, of all people, ought to understand this, but he entertains CIA fantasies.
This statement is quite bold, as Mr. Kotkin outright calls for other countries, each with a deep history that Mr. Kotkin does not seem to acknowledge as legitimate, to “submit” to the liberal international order.
“For the American public, Russia’s war against Ukraine needs to be placed in global context. The current US-led international order for decades has had three areas of territorial vulnerability: Crimea/Ukraine, Israel, and the South China Sea/ Taiwan. (South Korea is protected by a US defense treaty and nuclear umbrella and so are Poland and the Baltic states.) These areas are directly related to the three illiberal Eurasian land empires that view themselves as ancient civilizations predating the US-led liberal order by a millennium or more, and are unwilling to submit to that order as currently configured: Russia, Iran, China.”
The big problem for the world order that Kotkin pushes is that it never actually existed. The idea that some other power influencing Crimea, Israel, and Formosa is a threat to the American empire can only not be called absurd if it is understood in the context of the belief that the American empire was a global hegemony that previously controlled these places after the fall of the Soviet Union. The belief that America had conquered the world, and it now losing those conquests (which never happened), is the primary driver behind the delusions of Mr. Kotkin and those who share his views on the “liberal world order” (which never existed).
At the very least, he at least understood, earlier this year, that the Ukraine stands no chance of defeating Russia in open conflict, although he remains overconfident on American capabilities, despite much hedging to the contrary:
“To be sure, the US Army is a highly competent, dedicated service, with formidable capabilities, but casualties in land warfare exceed those of expeditionary or maritime warfare by many orders of magnitude—a difficult proposition.”
“Highly competent” is certainly not a descriptor that can be applied to the US Army.
Overall, we rate Mr. Kotkin as fairly lucid on Ukraine’s actual prospect, but still maintaining fantasies of liberal global hegemony.
The next essay, Why Putin Invaded Ukraine, is dual-written by Michael McFaul and Robert Person. This should be good….
“In this chapter, we argue that three factors-power, regimes, and individuals- interacted to cause this war. Specifically, we argue that the perception of an asym- metric balance of power provided a necessary, permissive condition for starting this war. A more powerful Ukraine and a less powerful Russia would have made war less likely. Second, regime types played a role too. Over the last twenty years, Russia has become more autocratic while Ukraine has become more democratic. Those divergent regime trajectories fueled growing tensions between the two countries. However, shifting balances of power and changing regime types were necessary but insufficient causes for starting this war. A third factor-Putin and his ideas-was essential. Enabled by a growing personalistic dictatorship, Putin and his distinct world outlook played a direct causal role in launching this invasion.
In focusing on power, regimes, and individuals as the causes of this war, we reject two alternative explanations—NATO expansion and innate Russian imperialism. NATO expansion has been a source of tension between Moscow and the West for a long time, dating back to the alliance's creation in 1949. But this tension has not been a constant driver of conflict over the decades; rather, it has been a variable. And it was most certainly not the main reason for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022: there was no movement underway to offer Ukraine membership in NATO at the time. There had not been since 2008.
Russian imperialism is a more powerful alternative explanation—a hypothesis supported by hundreds of years of history. Russia has expanded when it has the means to do so, irrespective of regime type or leadership, so the argument goes. True, Putin has invoked imperial legacies to help mobilize support for his invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That many Russians support his war underscores the fact that imperialist ideas are deeply rooted in Russian society. But there is evidence to undermine this argument of imperial continuity. Russia in the post-Soviet era has not always sought to attack or annex its neighbors. There has been variation, and that variation has been driven by power, regimes, and individuals. A less powerful Russia, a more democratic Russia, or a Russia ruled by a leader other than Putin would have been less imperial and less bellicose toward its neighbors, including Ukraine.”
Of course, the authors must maintain the lie that the idea of Ukrainian accession to NATO could not possibly be real without a formal offer being extended. We can also decode the “autocratic” and “democratic” language to mean that “Over the last twenty years, Russia has become more pro-Russian while Ukraine has become more pro-American. Those divergent regime trajectories fueled growing tensions between the two countries”
However, despite some NATO shilling and anti-Russian rhetoric, the authors acknowledge that it is neither the vestiges of imperialism or NATO accession that triggered the conflict. Rather, a mismatch between the balance of power and perceptions of the balance did it. Unfortunately, the second argument, which is that “democracies are less likely to go to war with each other.” Using our magical regime-speak decoder, we can translate this to the meaningless statement “American is unlikely to go to war with itself.”
P. 39
“Regime type is one of those factors. As a tendency in international politics, democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than with autocracies; the correlation of peace between democracies is a strong one. Power interacts with regime type too: the correlation of conflict between powerful autocracies and powerful democracies is also robust.”
The authors write about the “democratization” of Russia after the Soviet Union, which of course just means “Americanization.” And of course, to describe Russia as “autocratic” just means “not under American control.” In reality, virtually every country in the world is democratic, including the regimes that no longer exist, which are often used to back up this silly “democracies don’t go to war with each other” hypothesis.
Additional, the personal dictatorship angle doesn’t make much sense.
“In Putin’s Russia, power is exercised largely through informal, noninstitutionalized personal relationships: for members of the political elite, their power, influence, and wealth are derived not from their formal position in the Russian political system but rather from one's direct personal relationship with Putin. It is no wonder that nearly everyone thought to be in Putin’s inner circle today have relations that stretch back decades, some as far back as Putin's childhood in Leningrad, or his career as a Committee for State Security (KGB) of- ficer, or even his time in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office in the early 1990s.”
All of that is probably true but it can be equally applied to America. The demented logic of liberals is that, it is evil when Mr. Putin fucks you by himself, because that’s dictatorship, but when multiple bureaucrats take turns fucking you, like in America, that’s “better” because it’s more “democratic.”
Additionally, Russia is viewed to not be democratic because Mr. Putin enjoys a substantial majority in every election, with many other parties in existence but electorally unviable. Effectively, there is one party, but not in the Soviet sense. In America, the trick is that one party pretends to be two, with no remotely viable alternatives. Effectively, there is one party, in the managerial sense. As in my previous analogy, each system is effectively as “democratic” as the other. The differences are cosmetic.
The essay finally makes a point relevant to the argument when it describes how Mr. Putin views Ukraine as not-a-real-country and that Ukrainians are just Russians. This is an incomplete summation of his, and typical Russian views on Ukraine, but the authors set out to make this view seem to be a strange personal one.
“Putin played an essential role in starting this war; the ideas animating his decision to invade were unique, downright unusual, and decidedly deadly.”
In their glib summary of Mr. Putin, the authors more or less put forward the delusional idea that the war happened because Mr. Putin is “weird.”
The authors also take shots an Mearsheimer.
“Our explanation of the causes of the war also suggests what factors might shape its end. Putin is an ideologue. His strong ideological convictions compelled him to invade Ukraine in 2022.”
Truly, this essay is hot trash, especially in light of Mr. Kotkin cool and rational essay.
The next essay Strategic Fanaticism: Vladimir Putin and Ukraine, by Lawrence Freedman, will hopefully be better.
P. 55:
“The study of strategy is about how individuals and organizations, including The states, set objectives and seek to achieve them. The field is broadly defined as being about the relationship of ends to means, and for most purposes in most areas of human affairs, that definition suffices.¹
The original concept was more narrowly military, referring either to how the art was practiced at the higher levels of command or else what had to be done to get an army to the point of battle, with tactics taking over once battle was joined. The influence of the earlier conceptualizations is still felt, but since World War I, strategy has generally referred to the management of the politico-military interface-the role of the armed forces in achieving national objectives set by the government and that is how it will be used in this paper.”
Mr. Freedman writes that the conflict between Russian and Ukraine can be viewed “as a staged and dialectical process” and that the essay will look at five decisions:
P. 56:
“in the summer of 2013 to put pressure on Viktor Yanukovych to abandon the association agreement with the EU; to annex Crimea in March 2014; to direct the unrest in the Donbas and Luhansk from April to Sep- tember 2014; to invade Ukraine on 24 February 2022; to embrace more ambitious objectives and commit more resources in September 2022 in response to the success of the Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv.
The continuity in Putin's approach-the ultimate objective-has been an underlying desire to bring Ukraine firmly into Russia's sphere of influence, pref- erably by having a pro-Russian government in power in Kyiv and preventing a move into the Western sphere of influence by joining either the European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or both. This has been in ten- sion with a secondary objective, in play since 2014, which is to fragment Ukraine. The more this was done (starting with the annexation of Crimea), the more Ukraine was likely to look to the West rather than the East. The more territory lost to Russia, the less likely what remains of Ukraine will be ready to comply with Russian wishes, especially when it comes to getting closer to the West.”
The pressure on President Yanukovych of which Mr. Freedman speaks was to coerce Yanukovych into not signing a customs agreement with the EU. Basically, overreach in this area, such as Putin pressuring Yanukovych to crack down on protests triggered a counter-reaction in “Russophile” Crimea (by Russophile I assume he just means Russian but doesn’t want to admit it), which was then exploited for annexation. Without the pressure on Yanukovych, the subsequent events in Crimea would not have manifested. This seems pretty plain, so hopefully there is something more interesting in this “dialectical process.”
Unfortunately, the connection between Crimean and Donbas is basically that “Putin wanted more” and there is not much thoughtfulness put into the process. Putin “doubles down” multiple times as the full-scale invasion and Ukrainian counteroffensives take place. There is really little more to the thesis than Putin escalates when the opportunity to deescalate (i.e., decide to lose) presents itself. Basically, Putin has “bad strategy” because of “strategic fanaticism,” which is the “refusal to accept that the problem as framed cannot be solved, a pattern of error that stems from obsession and a readiness to go to extraordinary lengths to satisfy that obsession, even as satisfaction remains elusive. Dictionary definitions of a fanatic refer to someone with extreme beliefs that lead them to behave in unreasonable ways. Putin’s fixation with Ukraine, almost as soon as he began his second stint as president in 2021, has led to calamitous errors of strategic judgement.”
By “calamitous errors” I suppose he means “illiberal outcomes.” Mr. Freedman would probably refer to a “fixation with the border” in American politics in the same way he refers to Mr. Putin’s “obsession” with the Ukrainian borderland. No doubt, he would regard right-wing beliefs about the border as “extreme” and “unreasonable” built on a refusal to accept that the problem cannot be solved “as framed.”
Unfortunately, we had another moron in this chapter, but at least a less polemic one. Lets hope that Mr. Michael Kimmage can do better in The Failure to Deter: US Policy toward Ukraine and Russia from the End of the Cold War until February 24, 2022.
Unfortunately, we probably have an “intelligence community” shill on our hands, as he begins with
“With the sprawling invasion of Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022, the United States has had two notable successes. The first was to deploy intelligence in a way that unsettled the Kremlin, a venture so innovative that it was without precedent in the history of the US intelligence community. By keeping Vladimir Putin off-balance, the White House may have prevented a "false flag" operation-actions staged by Russia and intended to blame the war's outbreak on Ukraine. By impressing on Ukraine and many other countries the likelihood of war months before it broke out, the United States solidified and expedited the response to the invasion when it occurred. Washington's other suc- cess was to coordinate financial and military support for Ukraine. From the very start of the war, the United States has been the linchpin of a global coalition stretching across Europe and Asia. This coalition-crucial for Ukraine's many achievements on the battlefield, for its social cohesion, and for its morale- materially strengthened Ukraine in its battle against a powerful and dogged foe.
These successes, impressive as they are, are only part of the story.”
Unfortunately, we have no idea what these successes are, as he provides zero footnotes to support his sucking-off of the secret services. In terms of the topic of the essay, the inability to deter Russia is found in “four intersecting reasons.”
“The first is an ahistorical optimism about Europe: an exaggeration of Europe's genius for peace, for integration, and for the resolution of political differences by non- military means.”
“Another reason for failing to deter Russia was the lack of a coherent agenda for Ukraine.”
“A third reason was an aura of listlessness and distraction about the goals set for Ukraine in 2014-2015, which were to make Ukraine a part of Europe's wholeness, its freedom, and its perpetual peace.”
“Fourth was the underestimation of Russia.”
Something that made me laugh in the ensuing explanation was “Russia invaded Georgia—on Europe’s edge or within Europe, depending on the eye of the beholder.” The author is simply signaling that readers should consider Georgia to be within America’s sphere of influence.
P. 74
For the Obama administration, a Europe freed from zero-sum contestation was unlikely to elicit Russian aggression. No European country had the slightest inter est in acquiring Russian territory. It was tempting to attribute a similar sense of restraint to Russia's foreign policy. A secure Russia would not endanger the secu- rity of others. This Russia would either integrate into Europe or it would be too weak to interfere in European affairs. George W. Bush sought Russia's integration into Europe. Integration plus democratization was the end state of Barack Obama's "reset" with Russia. Ideologically at ease with Putin's authoritarianism, President Donald Trump was likewise convinced that Russia's true place was in Europe and not on China's side. Trump stated the need for partnership with Russia as if it were a transatlantic imperative. Those less certain about Russia's European path might find reassurance in the fact that Russia's economy was roughly the size of Italy's. Russia was a "regional power" in President Obama's words. It could perhaps obstruct outcomes; it could not dictate them. In the 2000s and 2010s, counter- terrorism and then an ascendant China were the first-order security threats. A Russia on the periphery of a peaceful Europe fell into a more benign and less inter- esting category. There was nothing there that had to be deterred.”
Later, “[t]he noncommital stace of the EaP [(Eastern Partnership)] harmonized with US strategy via-à-vis Ukraine, which since 1991 had been a holding pattern.” The idea that the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia (which had already occurred by 2008) constituted a “holding pattern” is a phenomenally brazen lie.
Getting to the topic of deterrence, Mr. Kimmage writes
P. 79:
“Another interpretation posits "Minsk” as deterrence, not just as muddling through, and in this light "Minsk” was a travesty. It did deter Russia from massive escalation-an invasion of a NATO country or the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere, provided Russia was considering these options in 2014 or 2015, which was unlikely. "Minsk" or the sanctions tied to "Minsk" may have de- flected Russia from its fantasy of "Novorossiya," the reconstitution of an admin- istrative unit from the era of Catherine the Great. Although empirical evidence on Kremlin decision-making is always spotty at best, a better argument is that Rus- sia was deterred from sweeping across southern Ukraine by a relative lack of lo- cal partners and not by Western sanctions. An inhospitable situation on the ground stopped Russia in its tracks. Confoundingly, "Minsk" was deterrence after the fact, deterrence as the undoing of extant realities, which Russia had established at the barrel of a gun. Russia contributed to the false impression that "Minsk" was deterrence by letting the violence die down along the line of contact in 2015 and by behaving outwardly as if Russia had been deterred in Europe. When it was no longer a war zone, Ukraine vanished from the international headlines. Russia was biding its time, while Western diplomats could congratulate themselves on restoring peace in Europe.”
Then, Mr. Kimmage does something which I haven’t even seen the worst Ukraine shills do, which is daydream about a possible Hillary Clinton presidency.
P. 80:
“A counterfactual haunts "Minsk" diplomacy. Had Hillary Clinton become pres- ident in 2016, and not Donald Trump, US and transatlantic policy toward Russia and Ukraine might have followed another logic. While periodically courting Pu- tin, Trump did little about Ukraine other than to mire Volodymyr Zelensky's pres- idency in a scandal of Trump's making. Trump did send lethal military assistance to Ukraine-most likely to goad Zelensky into damaging Joe Biden's reputation. Trump clearly wished to lessen the US military presence in Europe, in non-NATO and in NATO Europe. If implementing "Minsk" would involve any sacrifices on the part of the United States, it was better to leave "Minsk" unimplemented. By contrast, a President Hillary Clinton might have experimented with two separate forms of deterrence: the comprehensive arming of Ukraine and the prodding of European partners to do the same; and a sanctions regime that would not be static but would intensify with each month or year if Russia chose not to comply with "Minsk." Perhaps a tougher policy from Washington would have expedited the in- vasion that Putin carried out in 2022. Perhaps it would have altered Putin's over- all calculus and made him think twice about invading.”
Mr. Kimmage also writes about why the sanctions failed to deter Russia. He has no answers, only speculation.
P. 83:
“The inefficacy of sanctions can be explained in various ways. One is that Putin did not really care. He was going to restore Russia to the role it deserved to play in Ukraine and the world-at any economic price. Another explanation is that Putin understood the Russian economy better than Western policymakers did. Russia had enough access to non-Western markets to compen- sate for the severing of Russia's economy from the West and the severing of West- ern economies from Russia. A third explanation is that the break with the West was not an opportunity cost of the war. It was a reason to opt for war. A geopo- litical divorce would free Russia at long last from Western influence, Russia hav- ing devolved by 2021 into an anti-Western dictatorship, and it would remove the West's best source of leverage over Russia, which was its economic might.
The underestimation of Russia would persist. A few weeks in, the war was of- ten characterized as Russia's strategic blunder. This framing spoke to the horror of Russia's unprovoked invasion. More precisely, the motif of strategic blunder was a judgment on the limitations of Russian power. Russia stood no chance of win- ning a war of attrition in which Ukraine was motivated to fight and in which Ukraine had the support of the world's wealthiest and most technologically ad- vanced countries. Geared for war, Putin's authoritarian system was brittle, and by straining Russian society the war might break it. From these deductions came the phrase that captured the US position in 2022. Russia itself would not be at- tacked; Russia would not be defeated; but it would be led to a "strategic failure." Russia's war in Ukraine would be such a setback for Russia, such a dead end, that it would retreat back to Russia, that it would let Ukraine be, and that it would leave Europe alone. During the war's first two years, however, the West did not assem- ble sufficient deterrent force to make the war a strategic failure for Russia. Nor was Russia, which mobilized its economy for war and found countries willing to give it materiel, standing still. It was, rather, increasing its military capacity, meaning that the deterrent force required to counter Russia in Ukraine would have to be increased as well.”
Unlike the other essayists so far, Mr. Kimmage provides a mere five footnotes to substantiate the essay. The essay is entirely worthless.
Part 1 ends with an essay by the dreaded Anne Applebaum. As expected, her essay, How the War Will End, literally spouts nonsense in the first sentence: “The Kremlin planned to take K[ie]v in three days.” (I refuse to write Kiev the way she spelled it, so I made a substitution). This claim has long since been debunked; there was never any evidence for it in the first place. “Kiev in three days” was just a projection from Western armchair generals like Applebaum so that Russia could be measured to have “lost” in failing to meet an objective imagined by Russia’s enemies.
She continues,
“As the Russian army approached K[ie]v, Russian special forces would assassinate President Volodymyr Zelensky, remove his team, and eliminate his supporters. Thousand of prominent Ukrainians would be arrested or murdered. Lists of their names were already in circulation before the invasion began. Russian operatives, confident of their success, were already choosing which luxury K[ie]v apartments they would confiscate when they took over the Ukrainian capital.”
Seriously, do they get off on these fantasies? (yes)
In the section “Dispelling the Myth,” she is the second essayist to take a shot at John Mearshiemer. I think we can safely assume that these irrelevant hacks are “big mad” that Mearshiemer has totally outclassed them in his own public relations tour and rise to a new prominence in academic relevance.
She, like one of the other authors, also cites Mr. Putin’s essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” as evidence of his intent to invade the country. She also cites various alleged crimes committed by the Russian Federation during the war, the typical stuff you’ve probably read about before. This is an unhinged screed out of place next to the other essays in the book.
P. 89:
“At the same time, this ideological war is a bid to rewrite the rules of the post- war world. The Russians want to show they can bring back, with impunity, cruel forms of repression and occupation familiar to historians of the 20th century. For all of those reasons, this is not a war that can end, or at least not permanently, through a simple negotiation. This war will end either when the Russians win and replace the Ukrainian president with a puppet dictator, as they have wanted to do from the beginning, or it will end when the Russians, like colonial powers of the past, decide that the price they are paying for this project has become too high and go home.”
Reality-deny statements such as “there is no evidence that Putin wants to negotiate” and “Putin’s goal appears to remain the same as it was in February 2022: the destruction of Ukraine—all of Ukraine” litter the piece.
Applebaum calls for a full-scale war footing against Russia as a solution to the conflict. The essay is so utterly polemic and devoid of content that I am astounded that it was even published, even alongisde against the previous lackluster essays. It’s clear that the think-tank class has learned precisely nothing from the conflict they helped start. Of the essays in Part 1, on Mr. Kotkin’s is worth reading in any sense.