Scott Horton's "Provoked" (Preview)
Book Notes #42 Preview
Since, as I realized after publishing, my last review had some unfinished notes left in it, and it was generally terrible, I’m sending out this preview of the next review, which is much more interesting. The following is all of the free preview part in the paid post.
Scott Horton’s new book Provoked is the first essential history of the war in Ukraine. It is immediately apparent to the reader that this is a real work of historical study due to the exceptionally well footnoted sentences.
The book is sectioned based on Presidential administrations in the United States. The first section, George H. W. Bush, opens with the critical information about the numerous agreements made between the Soviet Union and the United States that NATO would not expand its current military jurisdiction if the unification of Germany was permitted by the Soviet Union.
This fact has been buried to the point that while some people will admit that James Baker did convey to Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would move “not one inch eastward,” they will insist that this was a throwaway one-off line with no formal written agreement and therefore no substance.
The book provides several useful historical analogies in addition to addressing the main point of whether there was or was not an agreement.
“One prominent example would be when President John F. Kennedy promised to remove American Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey — and implicitly Italy too — and never to invade Cuba again, in exchange for the removal of the USSR’s nukes from Cuba to defuse the Missile Crisis of 1962, one of the most crucial deals of the entire Cold War. For decades that agreement was secret and deniable, yet they still abided by it. Everyone now knows that is how the crisis ended.50”
The Cuban Missile Crisis was entirely negotiated on the basis of “handshake deals.” There were no signatures and no joint public pronouncements, and yet this most critical moment in the Cold War was settled in this manner. Likewise, the end of Soviet rule and the possible unification of Germany was another of these critical moments.
“Marc Trachtenberg, professor of political science at UCLA, similarly wrote that “no one really thinks that the words high officials utter do not commit them to anything until they are put into a signed agreement; if that were the case, meaningful exchanges between top officials would scarcely be possible.” He added that “otherwise purely verbal exchanges could not play anything like the role they do in international political life.” Trachtenberg wrote that in the strange case of the free half-city of West Berlin, wholly within Communist East Germany during the Cold War years,52 the Soviets had promised to treat the deal they had made regarding Vienna, Austria, as also applying to Berlin, and the Americans then took them at their word. President Franklin Roosevelt wanted the agreement to be based on a handshake to avoid sending a signal of mistrust. That deal, struck in June 1945, lasted through the Cold War,53 with the exception of the crises of 1948 and 1961.54”
On to the fact of the agreements made among the Americans, Germans, and Russians.
On February 2, 1990, James Baker and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held a press conference in which Genscher reported that “we were in full agreement that there is no intention to extend the NATO area of defense and the security toward the East. This holds true not only for GDR, which we have no intention of simply incorporating, but that holds true for all the other Eastern countries.”
To be clear, what was publicly stated was that not only would NATO not expand into other countries on its eastern edge, it would not even expand into the eastern half of Germany, even if it reunited with West Germany.
A further question in the press conference transcript was roughly translated to English by Genscher and clarified this further.
“The question was -- or the remark made by the gentleman -- “This idea apparently has not fully been thought out, and I'm referring also to the speech your Minister recently made at the Academy in Tootsing (?). There is the problem of the two blocs, and the Warsaw Pact apparently at present is in full dissolution. So how do you think this should work? How can the Federal Republic be kept within NATO? How can the GDR be expected to halfway enter into NATO.”
The Minister's answer was this: Nobody ever spoke about a half-way membership, this way or that. What I said is, there is no intention of extending the NATO area to the East. And I think you should wait for things to further develop, and you will see that from confrontation we will move to cooperation.”
Baker had the last word in this short press conference, and did not object to Genscher’s formulation.
In a further document cited in the book,
“A State Department document about the meeting reads: “Genscher confirmed … the new Germany would remain in NATO because NATO is an essential building block to a new Europe.” But it also said, “Genscher reiterated the need to assure the Soviets that NATO would not extend its territorial coverage to the area of the GDR nor anywhere else in Eastern Europe for that matter.” There is nothing in the document indicating the secretary disagreed with the foreign minister about this statement.62”
That footnote is:
“Baker/Genscher Meeting February 2,” State Department document NOD814, US State Department, February 9, 1990.
I found an additional citation else for what must be a copy of the same document:
“Baker-Genscher Meeting February 2,” George H.W. Bush Presidential Library, NSC Kanter Files, Box CF00775, Folder “Germany-March 1990.”
“That same day, according to Genscher’s chief of staff, Frank Elbe, he met with Baker at his home in Washington and they quickly agreed that NATO would not expand farther east. “It was completely clear,” he confirmed in 2009.63”
That footnote is for the Der Spiegel article:
Additionally the Genscher had another call on February 6, 1990, with Baker that covered the same ground in the presence of British Foreign Secretary Douglas , summarized in Mr. Hurd to Sir C. Mallaby (Bonn). Telegraphic N. 85: Secretary of State’s Call on Herr Genscher: German Unification in the collection Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, volume VII: German Unification, 1989-1990.
Mr. Horton makes the point here that the allies had discussed the issue of NATO expansion before talks with the Soviet Union even began and intended to be upfront and on the same page about what the policy would be.
Indeed, Baker delivered the message to Gorbachev as detailed in the unclassified parts of Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow from the collection U.S. Department of State, FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38).
“We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”
Additionally Baker posed the hypothetical to Gorbachev: “Let’s assume for the moment that unification is going to take place. Assuming that, would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward.”
Robert Gates had a similar conversation with Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB. Baker also reiterated the offer to Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9th.
The betrayal of Gorbachev began almost immediately.
“Since Baker’s idea that NATO would be confined to the western half of a reunited Germany did not make sense, the White House came up with a plan for a “special status” limiting the deployment of certain Western materiel, such as nuclear weapons, to the former GDR instead.
The next day, February 10, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, though aware of the White House’s new position, still took the softer Baker line, telling Gorbachev: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity. … [N]aturally NATO could not expand its territory to the current territory of [East Germany].”80 He did not mention Bush’s new plan for a “special military zone” in the East. At the same time, Genscher told Shevardnadze in a parallel session, “For us, it is clear: NATO will not extend itself to the East.”81
Gorbachev, believing he already had a deal with Baker, agreed with Kohl that “the German people” had the sole right to decide on reunification, without getting him to repeat Baker’s promise not to expand NATO in writing. Kohl immediately “pounced,” as Sarotte put it, announcing Gorbachev’s statement as official policy that night.82 Somehow it did not matter in this case that Gorbachev had only spoken a sentence and not signed a deal. It was enough for the West.
The next day, the State Department sent a cable to the embassies explaining, “The Secretary made clear that … we supported a unified Germany within NATO, but that we were prepared to ensure that NATO’s military presence would not extend further eastward.”83”
At the Open Skies conference on February 12, 1990, there is a note that reads “And if U[united] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non-expansion of its jurisdiction to the East.” The is is from the Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze notes from Conference on Open Skies, Ottawa, Canada found in the Hoover Institution Archive, Stepanov-Mamaladze Collection, February 12, 1990.
Mr. Horton then explains that the Soviets were told at the 2 + 4 negotiations that there would be no eastward expansion. Der Spiegel has articles out today that corroborate this. Although they do not cite their sources, it is likely the German version of similar documents. In this article, they include a bulleted list:"
On March 1, 1999, Genscher told the U.S. that he was opposed to the eastward expansion of NATO with the justification that "during the Two Plus Four negotiations the Soviets were told that there was no intention of expanding NATO to the east."
Six days later, the policy director of the German Foreign Ministry, Jürgen Chrobog referred in a meeting with diplomats from Britain, France and the U.S. to "the understanding expressed in the Two Plus Four process that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the West cannot be used for our own advantage."
On April 18, Genscher told his Greek counterpart that he had told the Soviets: "Germany wants to remain a member of NATO even after reunification. In exchange, it won’t be expanded to the east ...""
A second Der Spiegel article addresses the topic further:
“Luckily, there are plenty of documents available from the various countries that took part in the talks, including memos from conversations, negotiation transcripts and reports. According to those documents, the U.S., the UK and Germany signaled to the Kremlin that a NATO membership of countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was out of the question. In March 1991, British Prime Minister John Major promised during a visit to Moscow that "nothing of the sort will happen."”
Then, come the excuses:
“There is, of course, no legally binding agreement between the two sides from the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The verdict as to whether the West has broken its word depends entirely on how binding one believes the assurances made by Major and the others actually were.”
Der Spiegel is forced to acknowledge what Mr. Horton also pointed out:
“Informal assurances were not unusual during the Cold War. U.S. political scientist Joshua Shifrinson compares the 1990 discussions with the verbal agreements made between the Americans and Soviets that led to the easing of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.
This view of the situation is supported by the fact that it was extremely difficult for Gorbachev to accept NATO membership for a reunited Germany. It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin boss would have agreed to such a step if he had believed that the pledges from Bonn, London, Paris or Washington were anything but genuine. In fact, the German government ultimately had to accept a special status for the states that formerly belonged to East Germany, guaranteeing that the region would in principle not play host to troops from NATO alliance members or any other country.”
According to Bush and Scowcroft’s jointly written title, A World Transformed, page 240, Gorbachev gave the “green light” for the first steps toward reunification based on the assurances he had been given. There is really no doubt that Gorbachev was completely convinced that the United States was serious about its promises not to expand NATO.
Der Spiegel offers as a counterpoint the kind of non sequitur one often sees in response to lies on matters such as this:
“The 1990s was the decade of good intentions and vast illusions, on both sides. Gorbachev promised that the Kremlin would introduce democracy, respect human rights and recognize the right of countries to self-determination. He even broached the possibility that the Soviet Union itself could become a member of NATO. His successor Yeltsin expressed a similar confidence, claiming that “we are becoming a different country.””
Because “muh democracy” and the world is changing, or whatever, deals brokered can just be thrown away because human rights and stuff. Nothing in that paragraph has anything to do with the binding or non-binding nature of promises made.
“Later, Baker would say that his exclusive focus had been on Germany. Apparently, he was uncomfortable with having negotiated with the Soviets to the detriment of Budapest and Warsaw. Genscher would also play down the importance of his visit to Moscow, later saying that he had wanted to "gauge" the Soviet response, nothing more. A short time after that, the Two Plus Four negotiations began, extending into September 1990. The Soviets, Genscher said, never returned to the question of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, a fact he interpreted to mean that the issue had been settled.”
From the Soviet perspective, the issue had been settled. But, since Baker later regretted what he agreed to, it’s fine that he decided to retroactively change his mind. That’s how consent works, it can be retroactively retracted if one experiences regret (sarcasm).
Baker’s promise of NATO only covering half of Germany was not workable, so the West pushed Gorbachev to concede on NATO expansion into all of Germany.
“By September 1990, Gorbachev had given in on the question of NATO forces in the eastern part of a reunified Germany in exchange for restrictions on troop totals, nuclear weapons and a few billion Deutsch marks.93 “If Gorbachev had been a more aggressive negotiator, and if he had not had so many other distracting balls in the air,” Sarotte wrote, “he might have pressed for written guarantees from either Baker or Kohl. But he did not and by the end of February it was clear he would never get them.” She added, “Gorbachev appears not to have understood this sequence of events at the time, although by the end of the year he would angrily turn on Kohl, saying to the chancellor that he felt like he had fallen into a ‘trap.”
Mr. Horton points out that allowing NATO into all of Germany did not evaporate all of the previous assurances about the non-expansion of NATO.
“Shifrinson points out that contrary to those who conclude the final deal canceled any previous assurances about eastward expansion, Bush, in a phone call with Gorbachev on February 28, weeks after Baker and Gates’s Moscow meetings, “pledged that the United States would recognize the ‘legitimate security interests’ of all parties.” Combined with their previous assurances, “the new terms could be interpreted as explaining how NATO would avoid expanding eastward if Germany reunited within NATO.”97”
Footnote 97 references this article, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/40/4/7/12126/Deal-or-No-Deal-The-End-of-the-Cold-War-and-the-U, which goes on to say:
“Also important is the strategic backdrop against which the 1990 negotiations occurred. Just as policymakers in the early Cold War recognized that control of a unified Germany was the key to dominance in Europe, so did policymakers in 1989–90 recognize that East Germany and West Germany were the respective hearts of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.106 As Gorbachev told Kohl in Moscow on February 10, “When you say that NATO would disintegrate without Germany, this also applies to the Warsaw Pact.”107 Added to the fact that NATO is foremost a military alliance, offering the former East Germany special military status takes on new meaning: if NATO's two largest members were willing to limit their military presence in the former East Germany, then the Soviet Union had good reason to believe that prior pledges against NATO expansion would be upheld regardless of whether NATO jurisdiction formally covered East German territory. Indeed, even as discussion of special status for East Germany was in its early stages, Rice underscored the relationship between Western offers and Soviet concerns, writing to Scowcroft in mid-February 1990: “Moscow's primary concern will be that there be no further shift—in perception or reality—in the East-West strategic balance.”108 Conferring special status on East Germany could thereby signal that U.S. and West German leaders were willing to limit NATO's future relationship with the Soviet Union's most important ally and, in turn, the rest of Eastern Europe. Logically, if NATO did not militarily move into the territory of this ally, then it would be unlikely to move further east to include less important states.”
It is also interesting how the purpose of NATO was presented as being to keep Germany down, which is actually true, although the way it was sold to Gorbachev was disingenuous.
“Even though the White House had decided to cease any talk about future limits on NATO expansion, Baker again, on May 18, 1990, told Gorbachev, in response to a suggestion of an accusation from the premier, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before.” He continued, “But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.”114
When Gorbachev asked, “What is the purpose of NATO now?” Baker assured him it was no longer about keeping the Soviets out but the Germans down, again threatening that an independent Germany could get its own nuclear, or even biological or chemical weapons if not subsumed into America’s military order. While promising to build “pan-European security structures” over the long term, Baker again emphasized the danger of “having a separate, neutral Germany.”115
When Gorbachev objected that adding Germany to the alliance would “strengthen” NATO, Baker answered, “In the immediate, short-term, maybe. However, we are currently talking about a change, about adapting NATO, giving it a more political nature.” He told the Soviet premier, “We recognize the importance of reducing the Bundeswehr [West German army]. … We understand your concerns and we are taking them into account. I don’t think that we are trying to get unilateral benefits.” He again promised that “NATO will undergo an evolution to become more of a political organization,” and that “[w]e are making an effort in various forums to ultimately transform the CSCE into a permanent institution that would become an important cornerstone of a new Europe. This institution would include all the European countries, the Soviet Union and the United States.”116”
The threat made to Gorbachev regarding nuclear, biological or chemical weapons is quote clear in the original transcript, as it is the first thing Baker presents when Gorbachev asks:
“Gorbachev. And yet, what is the purpose of NATO? It was created for a different time, what is its purpose now?
Baker. If Germany is not firmly rooted in the existing security structure, there will be an entity in the heart of Europe that will be concerned with ensuring its security by othermeans. It will want nuclear security, whereas now, this security is provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If Germany remains in NATO, it will have a much easier time renouncing its nuclear, biological, or chemical potential.”
NATO membership for Russia is an intention that Gorbachev presents, but indeed, Baker does immediately change the subject in the original transcript.
“Gorbachev suggested the USSR would try to join the Western alliance, too. “After all, you say that NATO is not directed against us, that it is just a security structure that is adapting to the new reality. So we will propose to join NATO.”119 Baker changed the subject.120”
The same immediate change of subject occurred between Baker and Yeltsin, as the USSR was dissolving:
“Before the Soviet Union was even all the way dead, on December 19, 1991, Yeltsin reiterated Gorbachev’s query about Russia creating a “close association” with, or even joining NATO,129 at least “as a long-term political goal.”130 Baker changed the subject again.131”
The first part of the book demonstrates resoundingly that the unification of Germany and its integration into NATO was conducted on the basis of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that NATO would not expand eastward.
“In short, the only reason Gorbachev and the Soviets were so cooperative on withdrawal from Germany and the reunification of its halves, much less their further withdrawal of military forces from the rest of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet republic states, was entirely predicated on Bush, Baker, Gates, Kohl, Genscher, Thatcher, Major and the rest’s assurances that they would not take advantage of the situation, especially by expanding their military alliance eastward. And the U.S. administration was deliberately deceitful in leading them to believe it. As Shifrinson noted, “Ultimately, if Europe was to be linked by a new set of security institutions while NATO was militarily constrained and had an increasingly political focus, then formal non-expansion guarantees were superfluous.”132
One may object that the deals were struck with the USSR, not post-Soviet Russia, and argue that countries which were still Soviet republics or in the Warsaw Pact could not have been up for consideration anyway, but that is incorrect. As shown above, nations such as Poland and Hungary were brought up by name in the promises on NATO expansion in early 1990, along with more general references to Eastern Europe, while the Warsaw Pact was not dissolved until March 1991.133 Also, they had all signed the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which guaranteed “the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance,”134 and Gorbachev was already raising the question of even the USSR itself joining.”
It’s quite clear that this history has been intentionally hidden like many other histories. By burying all of these facts and simply never referencing them, they disappear, and because there is no major treaty that can be pointed to as the agreement, people just assume the Russian complaints are a lie. But they aren’t. It’s the western narrative that is a lie.