Putin And The Rise Of Russia

Book Notes #39

Putin And The Rise Of Russia is a book written in 2009 by Michael Stuermer that is both a biography of Vladimir Putin and a history of the Russian state since he became the President. Although Dmitry Medvedev was in office as President when the book was published, the author takes the view that Mr. Putin remains the leader of Russia, at least for now.

In the introduction, the author presents the standard view of the domestic Russian perspective on individualism and the state.

“Under Mr. Putin’s presidency the bargain between Russia’s rulers and Russia’s masses was simple: The people accepted an increasingly autocratic regime while the Kremlin delivered rising living standards as never before.

The social system is based on the tradition that the survival of the state is more important than the well-being of the people – and so far the people accept this time-honoured state of affairs.”

The author poses the questions as to whether or not Russia will become a member of the rules-based international order, or if it will stick to a parochial nationalism.

P. 2:

“Can Russia be persuaded from outside, beyond its manifest interests, to support those elements of the Pax Americana that continue to be regulators of globalization, like the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund? Will Russia support what is left of world order after the demise of the Cold War and the accompanying global, nuclear and bipolar system that is no more? In a nutshell: Will yesterday’s revolutionary power become tomorrow’s stabilizer of the industrial and post-industrial world from, as envisaged after the fall of the Soviet Union, Vancouver to Vladivostok? Russia clearly has the potential to act one way or the other, to be a force for stability or a force for turmoil. So far it seems that the leaders of Russia have not yet decided. Which way they go depends, in no small degree, on the West, its cohesion, statecraft and understanding of Russia.”

Wat means, “stability?” Stability does not mean stability for everyone, but stability for the U.S. and turmoil for everyone else. Russia, to the chagrin of many, is actually supporting the “regulators of globalization,” but in a way that takes them at face value and not what they actually are, regulators for Americanization. American wants its institutions to be supported, but “no, not like that!.”

P. 3:

“After all, the rise and rise of China in the Far East – which is not so far away when seen from Siberia, where much of Europe’s oil and gas comes from – poses vast challenges. So does the threat of radical Islam in the Middle East, be it the Iranians’ nuclear ambitions, be it terrorist disruption. For good measure one can add accelerating climate change and the spread – and eventual containment – of weapons of mass destruction, of terrorism and failed states, of cyberwar and organized crime. All those spectres haunting the world are of equal concern both to Russia and to Western nations.”

Since the 21st century began, regime historians have expressed concern over the “rise of China” while all actual action in the regime continues to facilitate the rise of China and to fight Russia instead. This concern about China is only ever expressed as if it it Russia’s fault for not cooperating, and American needs to handle Russia first, as if America cannot do two things at once.

The concern about Iran makes my point about the real meaning of stability, which is just the maintenance of whatever America wants. After all, the complementary nuclear arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War kept the stability of the nuclear paradigm. In the near and middle east, Israel enjoys a nuclear monopoly insured by the United States, and the rest of the Arab and Persian world essentially lives under the Sword of Damocles with no recourse.