Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile 1964-1974
Book Notes #23
This book will mark a return to the CIA theme of the blog, examining a specific theater of operations rather than a broad spectrum of cases. The title itself leaves no need for preamble, so let’s begin the review.
The initial forays of America’s attempts to covertly prevent Allende from winning the presidency began with stopgap funding to the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in 1963 (p. 34). For the 1964 presidential election, the Americans went all-on on the PDC (p. 38).
Prevent the Radical Party from formally endorsing Allende. “In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp.
Convince (by bribes) the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that would not damage his image as a reform candidate.
Redirect the subsidy directly to the PDC, and convince Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for postelection patronage.
Prevent the declaration of a third candidate (most likely Jorgé Prat, a conservative from a powerful political family) by bribery, and apply “pressure” to avert the splitting of the non-Marxist vote.
Provide financial assistance to ancillary organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant organizations, slum dwellers’ associations, labor unions, and women’s clubs, to bring their votes to Frei.
Initiate “specialized propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to denigrate Allende.”
The PDC was not a right-wing party like the Americans preferred to support, but the situation in Chile was regarded as sufficiently dire to support the center and left against the socialist and communist parties. The PDC received a large amount of money from the USA for a political campaign of the time, including $750,000, and additional $1,250,000, and then another $500,000 for a total of 2.5 million dollars, plus other smaller amounts (p. 40-45). The effectiveness of this funding in winning Frei he election is a matter of debate. The CIA claimed to have been critical in winning the election, but modern accounts are skeptical that the CIA was responsible for the result. The CIA certainly had an effect, however, and the PDC was subsequently viewed as an American party in Chile.
Jorgé Allessandri, the ex-president who ran against in Allende in 1970, had a much more grim view of the American covert meddling:
“Chile was [an] over-politicized nation accelerating its plunge towards chaos ruin and inevitable military intervention. . . . [The] PDC [is the] incurably muddled inefficient cutting edge for eventual open Marxist takeover which only armed force could and should and would stop, however much he lamented blows to Chilean democratic tradition.
Frei could not change stripes (he implied that he regarded Frei as a Chilean Kerensky) and therefore independents would oppose Frei to the end, running their own candidate in 1970 even if it assured victory of FRAP and put communists in GO[C]. At least such eventuality would trigger army intervention.
He held USG largely responsible; not only for its direct actions, but for support it gave to such subversive organizations as ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] and FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN], for the imminent Chilean crisis. Intellectuals surrounding President Kennedy had meddled ruinously in Chile.”
The CIA’s next major operation was from mid-1968 to 1969 in attempting to prevent the Marxist parties from gaining power in the Chilean congress.
The author writes:
“The various U.S. government agencies responsible for Chile, however, were not able to adapt their policies in Chile to the growing radicalism of Chilean politics, and they could not in their minds easily abandon their old political allegiances to the increasingly left-leaning and anti-American Christian Democratic Party (PDC).”
As we’ve seen from the previous books I’ve reviewed, the CIA is loathe to give up on activities it is invested in, even if they are counter-productive, so it is no surprise that the CIA found itself in this position. As usual as well, the CIA failed to really grasp the politics of the country they were meddling in. Exacerbating this problem was the typical disagreement between the CIA and the ambassador to Chile, leading to confused action that created an environment favorable to the Marxists in the next election.
The initial request for the 1969 election operation came from Ambassador Korry, who asked the CIA station chief, Henry Hecksher, to request that the 303 Committee (the Special Group that oversaw covert operations) to undertake a “limited covert election operation aimed at Congressional elections.” The PDC was approached but politics had evolved quickly in Chile, and was no longer interested in working with the CIA; instead, the party drifted further left and was interested in coalitions with the communists. The Radical Party (PR) was the only party to receive U.S. funds between the presidential elections, and had been part of the right-wing coalition that had elected President Alessandri, but it had also drifted left.
“The second and more obvious party that the CIA considered was the National Party (PN), the right-of-center party that had elected the popular and very conservative President Alessandri in the 1958 election. As the 1969 congressional election approached, it appeared that Jorgé Alessandri would once again seek to represent this party in the crucial presidential election in 1970. The Santiago COS noted that the PN was basing its election strategy “exclusively . . . upon [Alessandri’s] undeclared Presidential candidacy.” Nonetheless, the PN draws curiously little comment from the CIA in this period. For some reason, and despite the PN’s high poll numbers and control of most of the not-inconsiderable right-of-center vote, CIA cables do not reflect consideration of this party as a universally suitable alternative to the PDC. Drawn by their concern over the Left, the embassy seemed to be ignoring the Right.”
Ambassador Korry supported working with the PDC, to keep it from supporting the FRAP (the left-wing coalition). Despite the PDC’s leftward drift and the PR’s support of the FRAP, candidates would be hand-picked from each based on their likelihood of keeping the party out of the far-left coalition. Support was also to be given to a splinter from the Socialist Party (PS), the Popular Socialist Union (USP), which would hopefully split the socialist vote and allow a PDC or PN candidate to win.
Despite these intentions, the CIA knew it do not “have covert political muscle to impose its will.” It did not have the knowledge to vet the party candidates that were to be chosen, either, or know who would be choosing them. The State Department was skeptical of the CIA’s competence to pull off the operation, but did endorse it, and the 303 Committee approved $350,000 in funds for the operation. The 303 Committee stated that the objective was stop the leftward drift effecting the PDC a but also that “the 303 Committee would be just as satisfied if we were not involved in this election, even on a limited scale,” which is not exactly a solid endorsement of the plan, which is perhaps why the budget was so small.
In execution the parties involved were not in agreement on what the objectives of the plan were. The State Department believed that the mission was to “promote the election in 1969 of the greatest possible number of moderate senators and deputies in order to maximize effective opposition to the popular front candidate in 1970 and to create a body of moderates who could act as a restraint on the policies of any popular front president, should one be elected.” They also believed that Frei-style democratic reform government was the key to long-term success in Latin America. Although these views might not seem far apart, the proximate view versus the long-term strategic view is a very different understanding of the operation. The ambassador was primarily pushing the operation, but he did not have a strong understanding of Chile, and the disinterest of the 303 Committee left no one to coordinate the CIA and State.
Additionally, a memorandum sent to the 303 Committee indicates strong doubt about the execution of the operation:
“I should like to go on record as having serious reservations about the basic concepts underlying the proposal. . . . By and large, the subsidies go to individual candidates in the absence of any real indication of how they will use the funds, and without any control over the manner in which the funds are expended. . . . The mere insertion of funds to individual candidates does not assure us of any positive results.”
The author comments on how the PDC was flush with funds and the right-wing PN that was more likely to act in U.S. funds was perennially broke and in desparate need of funding. Considering the unaccountable allocation of money to the left-wing PDC, it probably would have been better to just hand the check to the National Party.
Another memo indicates disagreement among the CIA and State as to the purpose of the operation. It establishes the belief that the outcome of the congressional election would not effect the 1970 presidential election, while State believed that it would. Additionally, support of the PDC in the 1969 election was called into question as contrary to America’s interest in the result of the 1970 election. The CIA Station in Chile did not believe that the “modest Ops machinery” would effect the Alessandri candidacy in the 1970 election.
Ambassador Korry also had his own agenda, which seems to have involved continued support for the PDC despite its leftward drift as a continuation of Kennedy’s policy:
“Ambassador Korry might not have been honest in all of his dealings with the PDC and the CIA and was perhaps ensuring the continued preeminence of JFK’s favorite party before a more hostile Republican president Nixon took office. Korry’s 1998 remarks in an interview with the Santiago-based think tank Centro de Estudios Públicos make his reports at the time all the more curious. In 1998, when asked why the United States supported the PDC after it had clearly gone to the left under Tomic, Korry responded, “Why did we [support the PDC] at all? Because if he hadn’t done it, the Democratic Congress would have been on my back in two seconds, as having reversed the Kennedy policy, taken it out.” Was Korry pressured by some part of the Johnson administration to support Tomic and the PDC? There is no evidence for this, for the 303 Committee seemed untroubled by Chile and even the State Department was unsure it should support Tomic. While all the contradictory information makes it unclear where Korry stood with regard to Tomic, it can be offered that the former was less than transparent in his dealings with the latter. What can be stated with certainty is that these conflicting expressions, from the man who was responsible for the direction of the U.S. government’s election effort, did not contribute to the mission in a positive manner.”
As if to demonstrate the problems with supporting the PDC, the candidate selection process produced fewer candidates than what was expected.:
“While it had been thought, originally, that upward of forty candidates would be selected for support, the realities of the Radical Party’s Marxist tendencies and concerns over some PDC members sharply limited the number of suitable candidates. Thus, the in the first week of December 1968, “ in full recognition that the election program is a limited on which cannot in any significant way be expected to affect the prospects for 1970, . . . the Embassy/CIA election team approved then candidates for support [italics added].” Within two weeks an additional five candidates had been added to the list. These fifteen candidates were from all three “non-Marxist” parties, among which the United States included the FRAP-allied Radicals, as well as the PDC and the conservative National Party. While the number of candidates from each party has not been released, it is was recorded that these fifteen candidates were moderates for whom additional covert support could make the difference between election and defeat.”
The number of candidates was eventually whittled down to twelve by February 1969 (p. 68).
The author also tells us that $175,000 of the $350,000 was spent on propaganda efforts alone, and also that this is the first information Kissinger received about the operation (p. 67). This propaganda effort actually became the primary part of the operation: