Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front

Book Notes #35

Fighting in Hell is not what I expected—rather than a book similar to the memoirs I have also reviewed on this blog, it is more of a tactical manual sourced from German experiences and published by the U.S. Army in order to understand how to fight the Russian in the case such a conflict arouse. Although it doesn’t quite live up to its name, it is nevertheless interesting, and is from a genre I didn’t know existed:

“These accounts were written under the auspices of the U.S. Army after the war, and appeared as U.S. Department of the Army pamphlets in the German Report Series published in the early 1950s. The employment of captured German general and staff officers to write the military histories of their own campaigns was the brainchild of the late Brigadier General S.L..A. Marshall, assigned at the end of the war to the Military History Division of the European theater of operations (ETO). Originally the Germans began writing their histories as prisoners of war. Many had patriotic objections or feared Communist reprisals to family members still living in the Soviet zone of occu- pation, but their cooperation was ensured when the former Chief of the General Staff of the German Army (from 1938 to 1942), General Franz Halder, agreed to supervise and coordinate the efforts of his fellow officers. Halder was to continue in this role until his retirement in 1962 as a civilian employee of the U.S. Army. One prominent archivist remarked that it was Halder who thought the U.S. Army worked for him! Nevertheless, it was Halder’s sense of organization and his reputation that carried the program for- ward. By 1954, 2,175 manuscripts totalling 77,000 pages had been written by 501 German Army, Waffen-SS, and Luftwaffe generals and eleven admirals, in addition to hundreds of specialists. After 1947 most of the officers were released from captivity and formally employed by the U.S. Army to prepare manuscripts on various topics based on their own experiences, with captured archives placed at their disposal. The only lapse, and for historians a major one, was the Army’s failure to require the authors to footnote their work.

However, the U.S. Army military historians who oversaw the preparation of the series were adamant about not superimposing their own ideas on the Germans and were at pains to point out: ‘The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view.... [and] present the views of the German author without interpretation by American personnel. The authors’ prejudices and defects, whatever they may be, find the same expression in the following translations as they do in the original German.’ It was a remarkable demonstration of professional self-restraint. It is necessary to repeat a caveat for the reader of this edition as for those of the original pamphlets: ‘any mention of “normal methods” or standard infantry tactics refers to German combat doctrines, and applies to units organized and equipped in accordance with German regulations’.”

This particularly book is a compilation of four different manuscripts, two of which, and composing most of the text, are by General Erhard Rauss.

“General Erhard Rauss takes pride of place in this volume, as he did in the The Anvil of War. Described by Guderian as one of the German Army’s finest panzer generals, Rauss commanded the Fourth and Third Panzer Armies in succession on the Eastern Front, having risen from command of division and corps. His defense of Kharkov in 1943 with the XI Corps was a masterpiece of skill and leadership. His subsequent commands of two panzer armies when the tide had turned in the East against the Germans were virtuoso performances of stubborn, wily, and often brilliant employment of the defense. He was ultimately sacked on a whim by Hitler in the last months of the war.”

This is high-quality firsthand material. Although I expected to read about “The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front,” I found it much more interesting to consider the Russians then and now, specifically in comparison to the Russian Army in war in the Ukraine from 2022-2024.

The intro, of course, does contain some extremely stupid modern comments, so I may as well deal with that:

P. 12:

“All of this was inexplicably forgotten as Hitler and the Oberkommando des Heeres, the Army General Staff, blithely planned for a single summer campaign to break the back of the Soviet Union. Hitler’s overconfidence was understandable, given his loosening grip on reality, but there was no such excuse for the equal optimism of the General Staff, an organization that prided itself on meticulous planning. Winter clothing was only ordered for the sixty divisions that were to be left in occupation of European Russia after the successful summer campaign.”

First, Colonel Tsouras writes how the Germans planned a summer campaign and then marvels at the lack of planning for a winter campaign.

P. 14:

“That the Germans had come so close, despite their initial abysmal lack of planning for the unique military environment of Russia, and despite the suicidal leadership of Adolf Hitler, is an eternal testament to their skill as soldiers. That they failed, is a further testament to the consequences of an evil cause begun in a spirit of reckless adventure that no amount of skill could overcome.

Peter G. Tsouras Lieutenant Colonel, USAR (ret) Alexandria, Virginia 1995”

Second, Colonel Tsouras comments on how the Germans came so close to victory despite “abysmal lack of planning.” One wonders by what magic the Germans did in fact, come so close. Colonel Tsouras places it on the skill of their soldiers, but this is obviously ridiculous as one does not simply depend on the grit of the individual for an operation so large. Common sense dictates that the Germans must have planned at least approximately as necessary for victory, but unfortunately sense and historical reality are overshadowed by feelings of moral superiority in the victors.

Fortunately, the book allows the Germans their own perspective, and once past the introduction, the stupidity disappears.

P. 21:

“It is possible to predict from experience how virtually every soldier of the western world will behave in a given situation - but not the Russian. The characteristics of this semi-Asiatic, like those of his vast country, are strange and contradictory. During the last war there were units which one day repulsed a strong German attack with exemplary bravery, and on the next folded up completely. There were others which one day lost their nerve when the first shell exploded, and on the next allowed themselves, man by man, literally to be cut to pieces. The Russian is generally impervious to crises, but he can also be very sensitive to them. Generally, he has no fear of a threat to his flanks, but at times he can be most touchy about flanks. He disregards many of the old established rules of tactics, but clings obstinately to his own methods.

The key to this odd behavior can be found in the native character of the Russian soldier who, as a fighter, possesses neither the judgment nor the ability to think independently. He is subject to moods which to a Westerner are incomprehensible; he acts by instinct. As a soldier, the Russian is primitive and unassuming, innately brave but morosely passive when in a group. These traits make him in many respects an adversary superior to the self-confident and more demanding soldiers of other armies. Such opponents, however, can and must, by their physical and mental qualities, achieve not only equality, but also the superiority necessary to defeat the Russian soldier.

Disregard for human begins and contempt of death are other characteristics of the Russian soldier. He will climb with complete indifference and cold-bloodedness over the bodies of hundreds of fallen comrades, in order to take up the attack on the same spot. With the same apathy he will work all day burying his dead comrades after a battle. He looks toward his own death with the same resignation. Even severe wounds impress him comparatively little. For instance, a Russian, sitting upright at the side of the street, in spite of the fact that both lower legs were shot away asked with a friendly smile for a cigarette. He endures cold and heat, hunger and thirst, dampness and mud, sickness and vermin, with equanimity. Because of his simple and primitive nature, all sorts of hardships bring him but few emotional reactions. His emotions run the gamut from animal ferocity to the utmost kindliness; odious and cruel in a group, he can be friendly and ready to help as an individual.

In the attack the Russian fought unto death. Despite most thorough German defensive measures he would continue to go forward, completely disregarding losses. He was generally not subject to panic. For example, in the break-through of the fortifications before Bryansk in October 1941, Russian bunkers, which had long since been bypassed and which for days lay far behind the front, continued to be held when every hope of relief had vanished. Following the German crossing of the Bug in July 1941, the fortifications which had originally been cleared of the enemy by the 167th Infantry Division were reoccupied a few days later by groups of Russian stragglers, and subsequently had to be painstakingly retaken by a division which followed in the rear. An underground room in the heart of the citadel of Brest Litovsk held out for many days against a German division in spite of the employment of the heaviest fire power.”

Although modern bigoted westerners tend to look a the Russian as a bit of a brute, General Rauss cautions against such judgements:

P. 22:

“The sum of these most diverse characteristics makes the Russian a superior soldier who, under the direction of understanding leadership, becomes a dangerous opponent. It would be a serious error to underestimate the Russian soldier, even though he does not quite fit the pattern of modern warfare and the educated fighting man. The strength of the Western soldier is conscious action, controlled by his own mind. Neither this action on his own, nor the consciousness which accompanies the action, is part of the mental make-up of the Russian. But the fact must not be ignored that a change is taking place also in this respect.

The difference between the Russian units in World War I and those in World War II is considerable. Whereas in the earlier war the Russian Army was a more or less amorphous mass, immovable and without individuality, the spiritual awakening through communism showed itself clearly in the last war. In contrast to the situation at the time of World War I, the number of illiterates was small. The Russian masses had acquired individuality, or at least were well on the way to acquiring it. The Russian is beginning to become a perceptive human being, and hence a soldier who is able to stand on his own feet. The number of good noncommissioned officers was still not large in World War II and the Russian masses had not yet overcome their sluggishness. But the awakening of the Russian people cannot be far off.”

It would be foolish to imagine that the Russian soldier did not develop further since 1945, and this “awakening” has certainly occurred with the drop of the Iron Curtain and the full integration of Russia into the world. Although we may find some common characteristics that hold over from the Red Army, the Russian Army today is not the primitive force that was the Red Army, but a fully modern and westernized army.

P. 26:

“During the various political purges an appreciable portion of this command strata disappeared. But it is a mistake to assume that a deterioration of the higher command levels resulted. Such great progress had been made in military education in Russia that even the higher commanders available at the beginning of the war were of a stature commensurate with their duties. In this connection it must be noted that a nation as young, energetic, and populous as Russia, was able to draw on an inexhaustible source of strength. In addition, this group of officers was held in high regard by the populace, was extolled in propaganda, and was very comfortably situated economically. Many things testified to the position which the military leaders of the Soviet Union enjoyed in the state and among the people: pictures in prewar illustrated Russian newspapers, the display in Red Army office buildings of artistically valuable portraits of senior officers and of paintings showing episodes in their military careers, and the exhibition on stairways and in government buildings of banners emblazoned with the pronouncements of high-ranking military officers.”

This is interesting because common wisdom says that the Stalinist purges greatly damaged the competence of the Red Army, but General Rauss seems to have regarded his counterparts as competent foes. The Russian Ministry of Defense and lower officers are no doubt fairly competent today, although many westerners assume incompetence.

P. 33:

“It might appear that much of the fighting spirit and concern for the welfare of the troops which the commissars displayed should have been the responsibility of the commanding officers and not of the commmissars. However, it was always a question of situations in which something had to be done. The commanding officers generally did little, while the commissars acted. The passive character of the Russsian officers was responsible for the fact that it was not the commander but the commissar who discovered the road to action. Therefore, the commissar was really a necessary part in the structure of the Red Army. He was a sort of front-line conscience.”

This is interesting because it suggests an NCO-like utility to commissars where the usual view of commissars is that they mostly served a brutal political function rather than making tactical decisions where commanding officers would not. It seems that General Rauss’s understanding of Russians is quite different from the commonly-held beliefs about them in the west.

P. 36:

“In World War II the Russian infantryman had a noteworthy negative characteristic: He was not inquisitive. His reconnaissance often was extremely poor. Combat patrols were for him the means of gathering information about the enemy only when he thought it necessary. Although the Russian proved himself an excellent scout, he made too little use of his abilities in this field. The higher Russian command was always well informed on the German situation by means of radio monitoring, interrogation of prisoners, captured documents, and other means. But the intermediate and lower commanders apparently were only slightly interested in their opponents. Here again the cause lay in the lack of self-reliance and in the individual Russian infantryman’s inability to assemble into a useful report the observations made while on patrol.”

However, elsewhere General Rauss writes that the Russians were adaptable in reconnaissance and security. It seems that the Russians were not very operationally capable of reconnaissance, but at a tactical level could adapt and learn.

Some other interesting trivia is provided: in the Red Army, frostbite was a punishable offense, because it was preventable. The Russians were more adept than the Germans at surviving in extremely low temperatures, so it makes sense that the Red Army would assume incompetence rather than lack of provisions of soldiers got frostbite.

Another thing we can say about modern Russians as contrasted with the Red Army is that the mass-man attacks, disdain for human life, and inflexibility of the Russians is not longer present. Westerners incorrectly view the Russian Federation as a continuation of the Soviet Union and the Red Army.

P. 39

“Tank attacks generally were not conducted at a fast enough pace. Frequently they were not well enough adapted to the nature of the terrain. Those facts the Germans noted time and again through the entire war.

The training of the individual tank driver was inadequate; the training period apparently was too short, and losses in experienced drivers were too high. The Russian avoided driving his tank through hollows or along reverse slopes, preferring to choose a route along the crests which would give fewer driving difficulties. This practice remained unchanged even in the face of unusually high tank losses. Thus the Germans were in most cases able to bring the Russian tanks under fire at long range, and to inflict losses even before the battle had begun. Slow and uncertain driving and numerous firing halts made the Russian tanks good targets. Premature firing on the Russian tanks, though wrong in principle, was always the German solution in those instances. If the German defense was ready and adequate, the swarms of Russian tanks began to thin out very quickly in most cases. This fault in Russian tank tactics can be corrected only by peacetime training, but it can hardly be totally eliminated.

On the whole, the Russian armored force was not as good as the Russian artillery. Limited flexibility, and the inability of the subordinate commanders to exploit favorable situations rapidly and adroitly, were evident and frequently prevented the Russians from achieving successes almost within their grasp.”

It’s hard to say anything too specific on the modern Russian tanker, but one does get the feeling that Russia’s armored units are still not quite up to snuff, given the disasters in the opening stages of the war in the Ukraine. That said, the modern tank has access to and is opposed to very different technologies and circumstances, so the comparison can only be a weak one.

P. 43-44:

“Another specifically Russian battle technique was infiltration. It was a practice which especially suited the Russian, and of which he was a master. Despite closest observation of the avenues of approach, the Russian was suddenly there; no one knew where he had come from, nor how long he had already been there. Wherever the terrain was considered impassable, but was still kept under close observation to be doubly safe – just there the Russian infiltrated. He was suddenly there in substantial numbers and had already vanished into the earth. Nobody had seen a thing. Because of the drawn-out German defense fronts, it was no particular art to steal between the widely separated strong points, but it was always a surprise when, despite all watchfulness during the night, the Germans found the next morning that strong Russian units fully equipped with weapons and ammunition had assembled and dug in far behind the front. These operations were executed with unbelievable skill, completely noiseless and almost always without a struggle. It was a very profitable technique which succeeded in hundreds of cases and gained the Russians great advantages. There was only one method of countering it: extreme watchfulness, and heavily occupied, deep positions, secured throughout at all times.

Of the same nature was the Russian’s constant effort to establish bridgeheads (or advance covering positions, which are here included in the same category). These bridgeheads often served to harass the German and to sap his strength, and often were used as a base for Russian attacks. They were established by infiltration or by attack, and were a dangerous Russian tactic. It always proved wrong and absolutely fatal to do nothing about such bridgeheads or to post- pone their elimination, no matter what the reasoning. It was certain that Russian bridgeheads which had existed only 24 hours would during that time have grown into a serious menace. Though only one Russian company might have occupied the newly formed bridgehead in the evening, by the next morning it was sure to have turned into an almost invincible fortress held by at least a regiment and bristling with heavy weapons. No matter how heavy and accurate the German fire, the flow of men into the bridgehead continued. Regardless of all countermeasures the bridgehead continued to swell until it ran over. Only by using very strong forces and planned attack could it still be contained or eliminated, provided one was lucky and not afraid of heavy losses. Therefore, the warning against these bridgeheads can never be stressed sufficiently. There was only one way of fighting them, and that had to be made a rule: Every Russian bridgehead in the process of being formed, and every advanced position, no matter how small, must be attacked immediately, while it is still undeveloped, and eliminated. If the Germans waited even a few hours, they were in most cases too late, and on the next day success was more remote than ever. Even if there were but one platoon of infantry and one tank available, they had to be committed at once; the Russian was not yet dug in, he was still visible and within reach, he still had no organized defensive fire and no heavy weapons in the new position. A little later he would have all of these. Every delay brought disaster; only an immediate counterattack led to success.”

There have been a few instances where the Russians have cracked difficult positions through infiltration. Most recently in Avdiiivka, the Russians conducted a sewer infiltration of a Ukrainian fortification. The Russians bypassed and got behind the fortification by cutting into old, flooded sewer systems, clearing it with water, and moving 150 soldiers two kilometers through the system, which moved the frontline significantly.

This characteristic of Russian bridgeheads also seems to hold today. The infiltration mentioned above seems to have held, and it seems like anywhere the Russians manage to step, the instantly dig in unless immediately removed. When the Russians finally captured the “Terrikon” in Avdiivka, for example, they dug in forcefully and could not be kicked back out.

The Ukrainians, of course, are also a Russian army, and exhibit similar capabilities, including in Robotyne, which they captured during their counteroffenseive and can’t seem to be easily dislodged from, as well as on many other parts of the front that have been held since the beginning of the war.

P. 45:

“There was just one tactical misconception which the Russians could not relinquish despite all losses: the belief that an elevation was in every case the only terrain feature of value. They tried for every elevation, fought for it with perseverance and strong forces, without estimating whether it actually dominated the terrain or whether the situation demanded its possession. If the elevation was really important, the Germans thought it well to occupy it before the Russians; otherwise, it was to be expected that the elevation could be taken only with heavy losses. In more cases than had earlier been assumed, however, the possession of level ground was sufficient; the value of the elevation was frequently overestimated.”

This is interesting, because in the war in the Ukraine, the Russians seem to prefer to take high-ground positions wherever possible. It’s difficult to know whether or not the overrating of high ground is still present within the Russian Army, are whether or not the high ground being taken has tactical significance that is worth the sacrifice. Both sides seem to focus their tactical offensive operations on taking hills, though.

P. 46:

“Russian march reconnaissance and security generally corresponded to German concepts. Activity was not especially intense, but very skillfully adapted to the objective and to local conditions (terrain, climate, transportation routes, and weather). In his march reconnaissance the Russian was very hesitant, groping, and cautious, and allowed himself much time. If he found no enemy resistance, he frequently plunged ahead into the unknown without further reconnaissance.”

The book offers several views of Russian reconnaissance. “March reconnaissance” is probably an outmoded concept, as this refers to large groups of Russians, perhaps an entire division, moving at once. Now, units are smaller, more spread out, and reconnaissance seems mostly left to drone teams. From footage, Russian Federation soldiers seem much more cautious in moving around the battlefield.

P. 55:

“The Russians preferred to carry out their major offensives in winter because their troops were accustomed to that season and very well equipped and trained for it. The Russians were superior to all peoples of Central and Western Europe in enduring rigors of weather and climate. Casualties from the cold were an exception in the Red Army. Soldiers with frostbite were severely punished. Even in the harsh winter of 1941-42 the Russians were able to spend many days in the snow, protected only by simple windbreaks, without detriment to their health.”

The Russians have conducted winter offensive operations in each winter of the war so far, although the initiation of the war occurred at the end of winter in 2022. Modern technology can compensate for many seasonal disadvantages now, perhaps nullifying some of the differences in campaigning seasons.

P. 60:

“The Russians carried out their first preconceived large-scale offensive in the severe winter of 1941-42 in the Moscow area. It was well thought out, and cleverly exploited the detrimental effect which the muddy period and the onset of winter had on the striking power of the German Army, unprepared as it was for winter warfare. This offensive marked the turning point in the Eastern Campaign; it did not, however, decide it, as the Russians had expected it to do. Therefore, it did not achieve the intended purpose.”

Russian winter attacks do not seem so decisive in the war in the Ukraine, since the Ukrainians will be well equipped to deal with mud and winter. However, the Russians have achieved positive results from their winter offensives both years.

P. 62 :

“Though the Russians built field fortifications whenever they halted it did not follow that they had plans of attacking. The Russian always dug in. the time to be suspicious came only when a gradual sapping toward the German lines into a jump-off position for an assault could be noted in connection with their entrenchment activities. That usually meant preparation for an attack.”

This fact about the Russian Army seems to hold true today. The Russians and Ukrainians both have extensive field fortifications, and they seem to exist everywhere, and their presence and doesn’t telegraph anything in particular.

P. 63:

“Even at the beginning of the Eastern Campaign the Russian infantry was very lever at utilizing terrain features. If the Russians could not continue their current main attacks with the desired success by day, they proceeded to launch local attacks at night. In that case, they wither launched sudden mass attacks, or infiltrated at many points through the German lines which for the most part were lightly manned. Thus, in a night attack on the 97th Light Infantry Division in the winter of 1941, they broke through east of Artemovsk in the Donets Basin with an entire cavalry division. However, the next day this division was cut down to the last man. Also in the battle of encirclement at Uman in 1941, and at Beli – southeast of Toropets – in November 1942, thousands of Russian soldiers without equipment or heave weapons penetrated the German lines during hours of darkness by piecemeal infiltration. Well-prepared night attacks were rare.”

Artemovsk being mentioned here is interesting just because the battlefield is now active again, that the Russians have once again attacked Artemovsk, although more successfully this time (the Ukrainians call it Bakhmut).

P.65:

“The situation became critical. Only the 88-mm. Flak finally knocked out a few of the Russian KV1’s and forced the others to withdraw into the woods. One of the KV1’s even managed to reach the only supply route of the German task force located in the northern bridgehead, and blocked it for several days. The first unsuspecting trucks to arrive with supplies were immedi- ately shot afire by the tank. There were practically no means of eliminating the monster. It was impossible to bypass it because of the swampy surrounding terrain. Neither supplies nor ammunition could be brought up. The severely wounded could not be removed to the hospital for the necessary operations, so they died. The attempt to put the tank out of action with the 50-mm. antitank gun battery, which had just been introduced at that time, at a range of 500 yards ended with heavy losses to crews and equipment of the battery. The tank remained undamaged in spite of the fact that, as was later determined, it got 14 direct hits. These merely produced blue spots on its armor. When a camou- flaged 88 was brought up, the tank calmly permitted it to be put into position at a distance of 700 yards, and then smashed it and its crew before it was even ready to fire. The attempt of engineers to blow it up at night likewise proved abortive. To be sure, the engineers managed to get to the tank after midnight, and laid the prescribed demolition charge under the caterpillar tracks. The charge went off according to plan, but was insufficient for the oversized tracks. Pieces were broken off the tracks, but the tank remained mobile and continued to molest the rear of the front and to block all supplies. At first it received supplies at night from scattered Russian groups and civilians, but the Germans later prevented this procedure by blocking off the surrounding area. However, even this isolation did not induce it to give up its favorable position. It finally became the victim of a German ruse. Fifty tanks were ordered to feign an attack from three sides and to fire on it so as to draw all of its attention in those directions. Under the protection of this feint it was possible up and to set camouflage another 88-mm. Flak to the rear of the tank, so that this time it actually was able to fire. Of the 12 direct hits scored by this medium gun, 3 pierced the tank and destroyed it.”

This passage illustrates the dominance the KV-1 tank had on the battlefield: fifty German tanks were required in a double-envelopment assault, merely as a feint attack so that an eighty-eight could finally defeat the KV-1. The Russians had very few KV-1 and KV-2 tanks available for Barbarossa, but would have had many more of both and the T-34 if the war had started in 1942. This point is interesting in the context of the previous book I reviewed on this blog. The Soviet Union would have been much more well equipped in 1942 than in 1941, when the Germans launched operation Barbarossa. It’s difficult to imagine how the Germans could have won World War II but for a narrow window in 1941.